John Lachs is a fervent follower of the idea of relativism as is he a devoted educator both in theory and practice. His emphasizing of the benefits of relativism in philosophy on the one hand, and, on the other, stressing the role of teaching philosophy make me think of these two issues, that is ‘relativism’ and ‘philosophical education’ at the same time. I want to rethink of it in the context of the practical implementation with the teaching of undergraduate and graduate students who take philosophy courses (and similar courses: ethics, aesthetics, history of ideas, etc., be it in the classroom or online) within the institutions of higher education (at the departments of philosophy, humanities, the liberal arts, social sciences, and also outside of these). I think that this problem is important because it deals with the types of obligations of the philosophy teachers to provide their students with a responsible guidance as far as their (students’) developments is concerned, though the developments of the teachers are at stake here as well. An important part of this story is how much Lachs’s relativism is limited by his universal claims, and, hence, is it relativism at all. It seems to me that such terms as ‘responsibility,’ ‘obligation,’ and many others: ‘growth,’ ‘happiness,’ ‘critical dialogue,’ and ‘wisdom’ do not seem relative in Lachs’s texts at all, yet they constitute the main substance of his message on philosophy in education.